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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Lance Tyrell Taylor appeals from the district court's order denying him 
credit for time served as a condition of probation. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Taylor pied guilty to one count of grand theft. (R., pp. 58-67). The district 
court imposed but suspended a sentence of 10 years with two years determinate 
and ordered Taylor to complete drug court. (R., pp. 73, 86-90.) Taylor was later 
expelled from drug court and the district court revoked his probation. (R., pp. 
123, 127-30.1) The court awarded Taylor credit for 211 days served pre-
judgment and 81 days served after his arrest on the warrant for the probation 
violation in its June 19, 2014 order. (R., pp. 127-29.) 
On July 7, 2014, Taylor filed a pro se motion for credit for time served. 
(R., p. 139.) His counsel thereafter filed a motion to amend the judgment, 
requesting credit for 227 days for incarceration from August 13, 2012 until March 
27, 2013 and 107 days of post-judgment incarceration. (R., pp. 143-44.) The 
district court granted the motion to amend the judgment in part and denied it in 
part. (R., pp. 146-48.) Specifically, the court granted credit for the entire 107 
days of post-judgment incarceration requested, but maintained the 211 days 
credit for pre-judgment time served. (R., p. 152 (and 107 days for time served 
"on the probation violation").) The court entered its amended order revoking 
1 At this time the district court also reduced the sentence to seven years with two 
years determinate. (R., p. 128.) 
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probation, which included the new grant of credit for time served, on August 6, 
2014. (R., p. 150.) 
Taylor filed a second motion to amend the judgment on September 22, 
2014, which is identical to the motion he filed on August 1, 2014 (including 
another request for the 107 days post-judgment credit already granted), except 
that it addends documents. (R., pp. 158-65 (compare R., pp. 143-44).) The_ 
district court concluded that Taylor was entitled to 226 days credit for time served 
from August 13, 2012, the date of original arrest, until March 26, 2013, the date 
of sentencing, and for 107 days post-judgment credit, entering its order on 




Taylor states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred in its calculation of the credit for 
time served to which Mr. Taylor was entitled. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Taylor failed to show error in the district court's ruling on the motion to 
amend the judgment? 
2. Has Taylor failed to show that amendments to Idaho statutes regarding 
computation of credit for time served were intended by the Idaho 




Taylor Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Ruling On The Motion To 
Amend The Judgment 
A. Introduction 
Taylor's motion to amend the judgment requested a total of 334 days 
credit for time served, 227 days (from 8/13/12 to 3/27/13) for incarceration after 
his arrest until his sentencing and 107 days (from 2/26/14 to 6/12/14) for 
incarceration related to his probation violation. (R., pp. 143-44, 158-65.) The 
district court granted credit for 333 days (all but March 27, 2013). (R., pp. 188-
90.) On appeal Taylor claims he was entitled to credit for time served as drug 
court sanctions. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-20). This claim fails because it is not 
preserved for appellate review and because Taylor has failed to show entitlement 
to credit for time served. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts "defer to the trial court's 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous." 
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
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C. Taylor Failed To Preserve The Claim For Credit For Time Served As Drug 
Court Sanctions Because He Did Not Request This Credit In His Motions 
To Amend The Judgment 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
In his motion to amend the judgment Taylor did not request credit for time 
served at the order of the drug court. (R., pp. 143-44, 158-65.) The prosecution, 
in responding to Taylor's second motion to amend, noted that Taylor had been 
incarcerated as a sanction for drug court violations (R., pp. 175-76), but 
specifically pointed out that such incarceration was not within the scope of the 
pending motion (R., pp. 184 ("Mr. Taylor has not asked for credit towards his 
sentence" for the drug court ordered incarcerations), 185 ("It is also telling that 
Mr. Taylor does not request credit for those periods of incarceration.").) The 
district court denied Taylor's first motion for credit for time served on the basis 
that it was not filed by counsel. (R., p. 148.) Taylor has not challenged this 
ruling. (Appellant's brief.) There is no ruling in the record on Taylor's second pro 
se motion. Because Taylor did not include a request for credit for time served as 
a result of drug court sanctions in his motion to amend the judgment, and has 
further failed to claim fundamental error, he has failed to preserve this claim of 
error for appellate review. 
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D. Taylor Was Not Entitled To Credit For Time Served As Sanctions For Drug 
Court Violations 
A criminal defendant "shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration prior to the entry of judgment." l.C. § 18-309. In this case, 
judgment was entered on March 26, 2013, when the court sentenced Taylor. (R., 
p. 73.) He was thus entitled to, and was given credit for, his incarceration from 
his arrest on August 13, 2012 until entry of judgment and the start of probation on 
March 26, 2013. (R., p. 189.) 
"Generally, I.C. § 19-2603 governs credit for time served as it relates to 
the revocation of probation." State v. Denny, 157 Idaho 217, 219, 335 P.3d 62, 
64 (Ct. App. 2014); see also I.C. § 18-309 (when "the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from ... imprisonment and subsequently returned 
thereto, the time during which he was at large must be computed as part of" his 
term of imprisonment). Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the time a defendant 
is "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as a part of the 
term of his sentence, but the time of the defendant's sentence shall count from 
the date of service of [the] bench warrant." Thus, "[i]f a probationer has been 
arrested for a probation violation, the defendant's incarceration from the time of 
service of the bench warrant will count as part of the sentence." State v. Covert, 
143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
Review of the record shows Taylor was granted full credit for time served from 
his arrest on the charges underlying the probation violations. (R., pp. 152 
(granting the requested 107 days served "on the probation violation"), 189-90.) 
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On appeal Taylor seeks credit for the time he was incarcerated on drug 
court orders. He is not entitled to this credit for time served under I.C. § 18-309 
because his sentence was still suspended at all relevant times. Likewise, he was 
not arrested for a probation violation, and therefore not entitled to credit under 
I.C. § 19-2603. Taylor has failed to show any statute under which he is entitled 
to credit for time served as a drug court sanction. 
Moreover, his claim that he was not subject to serving such sanctions 
without credit for time served does not withstand scrutiny. At the sentencing 
hearing at which probation was granted Taylor was provided several orders and 
notices regarding drug court. The drug court advisory form instructed Taylor that 
he could be sanctioned, including revocation of his own recognizance release, for 
violating drug court rules, using controlled substances or alcohol, or tampering 
with testing. (R., p. 78.) Taylor was also advised he could be "held without bond 
for an indeterminate period of time" if he was "in violation of any condition of [his] 
drug court agreement." (Id. (emphasis original).) Another order provided that if 
Taylor violated conditions relating to drug court he could be "arrested and placed 
in jail" and "subjected to other sanctions imposed by the court." (R., p. 84.) The 
record shows that Taylor was held on drug court sanctions after his release and 
before he was arrested for the probation violations. (R., pp. 161 (held in "temp 
custody ... drug court"), 163 (held for contempt of drug court).) Because any 
time in jail between sentencing and his arrest for violating his probation was a 
result of a drug court sanction (or related to a different case), Taylor has failed to 
show he was entitled to credit for time served. 
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Taylor argues that time spent in custody as a result of drug court 
sanctions should be applied to his credit for time served as a result of probation 
violations because the terms of his probation did not directly provide for any 
discretionary jail time as a condition of probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) 
The record, however, clearly establishes that the court ordered completion of 
drug court as a condition of probation and the drug court notices clearly provided 
that sanctions, including incarceration, could be imposed as a function of drug 
court. (~, R., p. 78 ("I agree that the Court can revoke my ROR release and 
impose sanctions for failing to comply with these conditions of release."); id. ("I 
agree that I can be held without bond for an indeterminate period of time if I am 
in violation of my drug court agreement." (emphasis original); & ("I agree that I 
will be sanctioned if I test positive for alcohol or any other illegal drug."); R., p. 84 
("If you violate any of the above conditions, your bond or release on own 
recognizance can be revoked, you can be arrested and placed in jail, and you 
can be subjected to other sanctions imposed by the court.") (emphasis original)); 
R., p. 89 (imposing drug court completion as condition of probation)). Taylor's 
argument that he was serving his sentence or was arrested on a probation 
violation warrant or its equivalent is disproved by the record which shows he was 
in custody on drug court sanctions. 
The district court concluded that Taylor was not entitled to credit for time in 
custody between sentencing and his arrest on probation violation allegations 
because those times were the result of imposition of drug court sanctions. The 
record supports the district court's ruling. 
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11. 
Taylor Has Failed To Show That Amendments To Idaho Statutes Regarding 
Computation Of Credit For Time Served Should Be Given Retroactive Effect 
A Introduction 
Taylor argues that the July 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-
2603 granting credit for time served as a condition of probation should be given 
retroactive effect.2 (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-15.) His argument-that the 
legislature intended to render illegal all previously imposed sentences in which 
credit for time served as a condition of probation was not granted-is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 405, 
94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. Taylor's Claim That The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 19-2603 
Should Be Given Retroactive Effect Is Meritless 
An Idaho statute "is not applied retroactively unless there is clear 
legislative intent to that effect." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937-38, 318 
P.3d 918, 927-28 (2014) (internal quotes omitted). Such clear intent may be 
found either by an express statement of retroactivity or in the language of the 
2 The state notes that the entirety of the proceedings in the district court were 
completed prior to the 2015 legislative session even starting (see R., p. 201 
(notice of appeal filed 12/5/14)) and that but for Appellant's extensions of time the 
briefing on this appeal would have been completed before the effective date of 
the amendments upon which Taylor relies. 
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statute requiring retroactive application. 19.:. at 938, 318 P.3d at 928. "A statute is 
not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts antecedent to its 
enactment" but is retroactive if it "changes the legal effect of previous 
transactions or events." Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 
636, 642 (2002). "When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of 
the statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent." Leavitt v. 
Craven, 154 Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and 
citation omitted). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "legislative 
history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of 
altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature." Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 
(2011). 
In this case the district court awarded credit for time served in its June 19, 
2014 order revoking probation. (R., pp. 127-29.) It amended the credit for time 
served in response to two motions to correct an illegal sentence, entering these 
orders on August 5, 2014 and November 24, 2014, respectively. (R., pp. 146, 
188.) Only this second order was appealed. (R., p. 201.) The legislature 
passed amendments to the statutes governing credit for time served, effective 
July 1, 2015. I.C. § 67-510. The amendments were thus passed well after the 
court entered its orders. 
The statutory language in the amendments shows that the legislature 
intended the amendments to apply at the time the court calculated time served 
upon imposing judgment. The amendment to I.C. § 18-309 provides: 
10 
In computing the term of imprisonment when judgment has been 
withheld and is later entered or sentence has been suspended and 
is later imposed, the person against whom the judgment is entered 
or imposed shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration served as a condition of probation under the original 
withheld or suspended judgment. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 1, p. 240 (emphasis added). As the italicized 
language indicates, under the plain language of the amendment the time the 
statute applies is upon entry of judgment after the probation violation has been 
found. Likewise, the amended I.C. § 19-2603 provides: 
When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and 
conditions of probation, it may ... revoke probation. The defendant 
shall receive credit for time served ... for any time served as a 
condition of probation under the withheld judgment or suspended 
sentence. 
2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 99, § 2, p. 240 (emphasis added). Again, the 
contemplated time-frame for the awarding of credit for time served is at the time 
the court revoked the probation. 
Nothing in the statutes as they existed or as amended suggests a 
legislative intent to render illegal prior calculations of time served. Rather, the 
statutes evince a clear intent that the amendments should apply only to those 
calculations of time served made after the amendments were effective. In this 
case the district court entered its order revoking probation on June 19, 2014, and 
that order was not appealed. (R., p. 127.) Nothing in the amendments indicates 
a legislative intent to render any part of that order retroactively illegal. Because 
the amount of credit for time served was calculated before the amendments, 
those amendments are simply irrelevant to this appeal. 
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Taylor has failed to show that the amendments he invokes were in any 
way applicable to legal proceedings concluded before the amendments were 
passed and effective. He has therefore failed to show error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying the second motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
DATED this 10th day of September, 2015. 
Deputy Attorney Gen 
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